organization of the Government, it was solemnly recognized in an
amendment. We are not disposed, however, to look for arguments to
the debates and discussions of the Convention, in our view often
a deceptive and dangerous method of construing a law, since the
vote is very frequently given on even conflicting reasons.
Different minds arrive at the same results by different
processes; and it is no unusual thing for men to deny each
other's premises while they accept their conclusions. We shall
look, therefore, solely to the compact itself, as the most
certain mode of ascertaining what was done.

No one will deny that all the great powers of sovereignty are
directly conceded to the Union. The right to make war and peace,
to coin money, maintain armies and navies, &c., &c., in
themselves overshadow most of the sovereignty of the States. The
amendatory clause would seem to annihilate it. By the provisions
of that clause three fourths of the States can take away all the
powers and rights now resting in the hands of the respective
States, with a single exception. This exception gives breadth and
emphasis to the efficiency of the clause. It will be remembered
that all this can be done within the present Constitution. It is
a part of the original bargain. Thus, New York can legally be
deprived of the authority to punish for theft, to lay out
highways, to incorporate banks, and all the ordinary interests
over which she at present exercises control, every human being
within her limits dissenting. Now as sovereignty means power in
the last resort, this amendatory clause most clearly deprives the
State of all sovereign power thus put at the disposition of
Conventions of the several States; in fact, the votes of these
Conventions, or that of the respective legislatures acting in the