same capacity, is nothing but the highest species of legislation
known to the country; and no other mode of altering the
institutions would be legal. It follows unavoidably, we repeat,
that the sovereignty which remains in the several States must be
looked for solely in the exception. What then is this exception?

It is a provision which says, that no State may be deprived of
its equal representation in the Senate, without its own consent.
It might well be questioned whether this provision of the
Constitution renders a Senate indispensable to the Government.
But we are willing to concede this point and admit that it does.
Can the vote of a single State, which is one of a body of thirty,
and which is bound to submit to the decision of a legal majority,
be deemed a sovereign vote? Assuming that the whole power of the
Government of the United States were in the Senate, would any one
State be sovereign in such a condition of things? We think not.
But the Senate does not constitute by any means the whole or the
half of the authority of this Government; its legislative power
is divided with a popular body, without the concurrence of which
it can do nothing; this dilutes the sovereignty to a degree that
renders it very imperceptible, if not very absurd. Nor is this
all. After a law is passed by the concurrence of the two houses
of Congress it is sent to a perfectly independent tribunal to
decide whether it is in conformity with the principles of the
great national compact; thus demonstrating, as we assume, that
the sovereignty of this whole country rests, not in its people,
not in its States, but in the Government of the Union.

Sovereignty, and that of the most absolute character, is
indispensable to the right of secession: Nay, sovereignty, in the