it would seem a republic cannot possess. We allude to the
transmission of a nominal executive power that spares the
turmoil, expense, and struggles of an election, and which answers
all the purposes of the real authorities of the State in
designating those who are to exercise the functions of rulers for
the time being. It has often been predicted that the periodical
elections of the chief magistrate of this country will, at no
distant day, destroy the institutions. It would be idle to deny
that the danger manifestly increases with the expedients of
factions; and that there are very grave grounds for apprehending
the worst consequences from this source of evil. As it now is,
the working of the system has already produced a total departure
from the original intention of the Government; a scheme,
probably, that was radically defective when adopted, and which
contained the seeds of its own ruin. Recourse to electors has
become an idle form, ponderous and awkward, and in some of its
features uselessly hazardous. We are in the habit of comparing
the cost of government in this country with that of other nations
in the Old World. Beyond a question, the Americans enjoy great
advantages in this important particular, owing to their exemption
from sources of expenses that weigh so heavily on those who rely
for the peace of society solely on the strong hand. But confining
the investigation simply to the cost of Executives it may well be
questioned if we have not adopted the most expensive mode at
present known among civilized nations. We entertain very little
doubt that the cost of a presidential election fully equals the
expenditures of the empire of Great Britain, liberal as they are
known to be, for the maintenance of the dignity of its chief
magistracy. Nor is this the worst of it; for while much of the
civil list of a monarch is usefully employed in cherishing the