have been speedily achieved. Andrew demanded a reorganization, based upon
acceptance of the results of the war, but carried through with the aid of
"those who are by their intelligence and character the natural leaders of
their people and who surely will lead them by and by. "These men cannot be
kept out forever, said he, for the capacity of leadership is a gift, not a
device. They whose courage, talents, and will entitle them to lead, will lead
. . . . If we cannot gain their support of the just measures needful for the
work of safe reorganization, reorganization will be delusive and full of
danger. They are the most hopeful subjects to deal with. They have the brain
and the experience and the education to enable them to understand . . . the
present situation. They have the courage as well as the skill to lead the
people in the direction their judgments point . . . . Is it consistent with
reason and our knowledge of human nature, to believe the masses of Southern
men able to face about, to turn their backs on those they have trusted and
followed, and to adopt the lead of those who have no magnetic hold on their
hearts or minds? It would be idle to reorganize by the colored vote. If the
popular vote of the white race is not to be had in favor of the guarantees
justly required, then I am in favor of holding on--just where we are now. I am
not in favor of a surrender of the present rights of the Union to a struggle
between a white minority aided by the freedmen on one hand, against the
majority of the white race on the other. I would not consent, having rescued
those states by arms from Secession and rebellion, to turn them over to
anarchy and chaos."

The Southerners, Unionists as well as Confederates, had their views as well,
but at Washington these carried little influence. The former Confederates
would naturally favor the plan which promised best for the white South, and
their views were most nearly met by those of President Lincoln. Although he
held that in principle a new Union had arisen out of the war, as a matter of
immediate political expediency he was prepared to build on the assumption that