the old Union still existed. The Southern Unionists cared little for theories;
they wanted the Confederates punished, themselves promoted to high offices,
and the Negro kept from the ballot box.

Even at the beginning of 1866, it was not too much to hope that the majority
of former Republicans would accept conservative methods, provided the
so-called "fruits of the war" were assured--that is, equality of civil rights,
the guarantee of the United States war debt, the repudiation of the
Confederate debt, the temporary disfranchisement of the leading Confederates,
and some arrangement which would keep the South from profiting by
representation based on the non-voting Negro population. But amid many
conflicting policies, none attained to continuous and compelling authority.

The plan first put to trial was that of President Lincoln. It was a definite
plan designed to meet actual conditions and, had he lived, he might have been
able to carry it through successfully. Not a theorist, but an opportunist of
the highest type, sobered by years of responsibility in war time, and fully
understanding the precarious situation in 1865, Lincoln was most anxious to
secure an early restoration of solidarity with as little friction as possible.
Better than most Union leaders he appreciated conditions in the South, the
problem of the races, the weakness of the Southern Unionists, and the
advantage of calling in the old Southern leaders. He was generous and
considerate; he wanted no executions or imprisonments; he wished the leaders
to escape; and he was anxious that the mass of Southerners be welcomed back
without loss of rights. "There is," he declared, "too little respect for their
rights," an unwillingness, in short, to treat them as fellow citizens.

This executive policy had been applied from the beginning of the war as
opportunity offered. The President used the army to hold the Border States in
the Union, to aid in "reorganizing" Unionist Virginia and in establishing West