Though Cervera was safe in harbor, the maneuver of the American
fleet cannot be called unsuccessful. Cervera would have preferred
to be at San Juan, where there was a navy yard and where his
position would have obliged the American fleet either to split
into two divisions separated by eight hundred miles or to leave
him free range of action. Next to San Juan he would have
preferred Havana or, Cienfuegos, which were connected by railroad
and near which lay the bulk of the Spanish Army. He found himself
instead at the extreme eastern end of Cuba in a port with no
railroad connection with Havana, partly blocked by the
insurgents, and totally unable to supply him with necessities.

Unless Cervera could leave Santiago, his expedition would
obviously have been useless. Though it was the natural function
of the American fleet to blockade him, for a week after his
arrival there was an interesting game of hide and seek between
the two fleets. The harbors of Cienfuegos and of Santiago are
both landlocked by high hills, and Cervera had entered Santiago
without being noticed by the Americans, as that part of the coast
was not under blockade. Schley thought Cervera was at Cienfuegos;
Sampson was of the opinion that he was at Santiago. When it
became known that the enemy had taken refuge in Santiago, Schley
began the blockade on the 28th of May, but stated that he could
not continue long in position owing to lack of coal. On the 1st
of June Sampson arrived and assumed command of the blockading
squadron.

With the bottling up of Cervera, the first stage of the war
passed. The navy had performed its primary function: it had
established its superiority and had obtained the control of the