the same distance, and all the turnings round must be done over again.

The first appearance of affairs at Ticonderoga wore such an
unpromising aspect, that it was necessary, in July, to detach a part
of the forces to the support of that quarter, which were otherwise
destined or intended to act against you; and this, perhaps, has been
the means of postponing your downfall to another campaign. The
destruction of one army at a time is work enough. We know, sir, what
we are about, what we have to do, and how to do it.

Your progress from the Chesapeake, was marked by no capital stroke of
policy or heroism. Your principal aim was to get General Washington
between the Delaware and Schuylkill, and between Philadelphia and
your army. In that situation, with a river on each of his flanks,
which united about five miles below the city, and your army above
him, you could have intercepted his reinforcements and supplies, cut
off all his communication with the country, and, if necessary, have
despatched assistance to open a passage for General Burgoyne. This
scheme was too visible to succeed: for had General Washington
suffered you to command the open country above him, I think it a very
reasonable conjecture that the conquest of Burgoyne would not have
taken place, because you could, in that case, have relieved him. It
was therefore necessary, while that important victory was in
suspense, to trepan you into a situation in which you could only be
on the defensive, without the power of affording him assistance. The
manoeuvre had its effect, and Burgoyne was conquered.

There has been something unmilitary and passive in you from the time
of your passing the Schuylkill and getting possession of
Philadelphia, to the close of the campaign. You mistook a trap for a