conquest, the probability of which had been made known to Europe, and
the edge of your triumph taken off by our own information long before.

Having got you into this situation, a scheme for a general attack
upon you at Germantown was carried into execution on the 4th of
October, and though the success was not equal to the excellence of
the plan, yet the attempting it proved the genius of America to be on
the rise, and her power approaching to superiority. The obscurity of
the morning was your best friend, for a fog is always favorable to a
hunted enemy. Some weeks after this you likewise planned an attack on
General Washington while at Whitemarsh. You marched out with infinite
parade, but on finding him preparing to attack you next morning, you
prudently turned about, and retreated to Philadelphia with all the
precipitation of a man conquered in imagination.

Immediately after the battle of Germantown, the probability of
Burgoyne's defeat gave a new policy to affairs in Pennsylvania, and
it was judged most consistent with the general safety of America, to
wait the issue of the northern campaign. Slow and sure is sound work.
The news of that victory arrived in our camp on the 18th of October,
and no sooner did that shout of joy, and the report of the thirteen
cannon reach your ears, than you resolved upon a retreat, and the
next day, that is, on the 19th, you withdrew your drooping army into
Philadelphia. This movement was evidently dictated by fear; and
carried with it a positive confession that you dreaded a second
attack. It was hiding yourself among women and children, and sleeping
away the choicest part of the campaign in expensive inactivity. An
army in a city can never be a conquering army. The situation admits
only of defence. It is mere shelter: and every military power in
Europe will conclude you to be eventually defeated.