PHIL. What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between
affirming and denying?

HYL. I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful
heat cannot exist without the mind.

PHIL. It hath not therefore according to you, any REAL being?

HYL. I own it.

PHIL. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really
hot?

HYL. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say,
there is no such thing as an intense real heat.

PHIL. But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally
real; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more
undoubtedly real than the lesser?

HYL. True: but it was because I did not then consider the ground there
is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is
this: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of
painful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it
follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving
corporeal substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an
inferior degree to exist in such a substance.

PHIL. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which