exist only in the mind from those which exist without it?

HYL. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist
unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in
the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to
think the same of them.

PHIL. I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable
of pleasure, any more than of pain.

HYL. I did.

PHIL. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what
causes uneasiness, a pleasure?

HYL. What then?

PHIL. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving
substance, or body.

HYL. So it seems.

PHIL. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not
painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance; may
we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any
degree of heat whatsoever?

HYL. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a
pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.