had spoken about a 'desperate' plan which he could not
trust his brigadiers to carry out, and which he was then
too sick to carry out himself.

Now that he was 'patched up' enough for a few days, and
that the chance seemed to be within his grasp, he made
up his mind to strike at once. He knew that the little
French post above the Anse au Foulon was commanded by
one of Bigot's blackguards; Vergor, whose Canadian
militiamen were as slack as their commander. He knew that
the Samos battery, a little farther from Quebec, had too
small a garrison, with only five guns and no means of
firing them on the landward side; so that any of his men,
once up the heights, could rush it from the rear. He knew
the French had only a few weak posts the whole way down
from Cap Rouge, and that these posts often let convoys
of provision boats pass quietly at night into the Anse
au Foulon. He knew that some of Montcalm's best regulars
had gone to Montreal with Levis, the excellent French
second-in-command, to strengthen the defence against
Amherst's slow advance from Lake Champlain. He knew that
Montcalm still had a total of 10,000 men between Montmorency
and Quebec, as against his own attacking force of 5,000;
yet he also knew that the odds of two to one were reversed
in his favour so far as European regulars were concerned;
for Montcalm could not now bring 3,000 French regulars
into immediate action at any one spot. Finally, he knew
that all the French were only half-fed, and that those
with Bougainville were getting worn out by having to
march across country, in a fruitless effort to keep pace