with the ships of Holmes's squadron and convoy, which
floated up and down with the tide.

Wolfe's plan was to keep the French alarmed more than
ever at the two extreme ends of their line--Beauport
below Quebec and Pointe-aux-Trembles above--and then to
strike home at their undefended centre, by a surprise
landing at the Anse au Foulon. Once landed, well before
daylight, he could rush Vergor's post and the Samos
battery, march across the Plains, and form his line of
battle a mile from Quebec before Montcalm could come up
in force from Beauport. Probably he could also defeat
him before Bougainville could march down from some point
well above Cap Rouge.

There were chances to reckon with in this plan. But so
there are in all plans; and to say Wolfe took Quebec by
mere luck is utter nonsense. He was one of the deepest
thinkers on war who ever lived, especially on the British
kind of war, by land and sea together; and he had had
the preparation of a lifetime to help him in using a
fleet and army that worked together like the two arms of
one body. He simply made a plan which took proper account
of all the facts and all the chances. Fools make lucky
hits, now and then, by the merest chance. But no one
except a genius can make and carry out a plan like Wolfe's,
which meant at least a hundred hits running, all in the
selfsame spot.

No sooner had Wolfe made his admirable plan that Monday