ties of country, family, or property, who had brought with them from
their unhappy homes the seeds of insubordination and rebellion. The
repeated spectacles of torture and of death had rudely burst the
tenderer threads of moral feeling, and had given an unnatural harshness
to the national character.

Still the rebellion would have crouched timorously and silently on the
ground if it had not found a support in the nobility. Charles V. had
spoiled the Flemish nobles of the Netherlands by making them the
participators of his glory, by fostering their national pride, by the
marked preference he showed for them over the Castilian nobles, and by
opening an arena to their ambition in every part of his empire. In the
late war with France they had really deserved this preference from
Philip; the advantages which the king reaped from the peace of Chateau-
Cambray were for the most part the fruits of their valor, and they now
sensibly missed the gratitude on which they had so confidently reckoned.
Moreover, the separation of the German empire from the Spanish monarchy,
and the less warlike spirit of the new government, had greatly narrowed
their sphere of action, and, except in their own country, little
remained for them to gain. And Philip now appointed his Spaniards where
Charles V. had employed the Flemings. All the passions which the
preceding government had raised and kept employed still survived in
peace; and in default of a legitimate object these unruly feelings
found, unfortunately, ample scope in the grievances of their country.
Accordingly, the claims and wrongs which had been long supplanted by new
passions were now drawn from oblivion. By his late appointments the
king had satisfied no party; for those even who obtained offices were
not much more content than those who were entirely passed over, because
they had calculated on something better than they got. William of
Orange had received four governments (not to reckon some smaller